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BAUCUS
1 Remarks of Senator Max Baucus
United States-China Business Council
Wednesday, July 15, 1998
Good afternoon everyone and welcome. I am
pleased to have the opportunity to share with you
some of my reflections about my trip to China with
President Clinton. And talk about wAt I think is
important to continue on a road toward strengthening
our strategic relationship with China.
Before I begin, I would just like to take a moment
to thank my long time friend, Bob Kapp, who has done
a masterful job as president of U.S.-China Business
Council. eep up the great work, Bo
A
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As we continue this dialogue on Sino-American
relations, I think we have to ask ourselves two
questions:
One, what do we want our relationship with China
to be?
And, two, what do we expect China to do to meet
our expectations as a strategic partner?
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And now the question we've all been waiting for -
Was the trip to China worth it? Despite relatively little
progress in the trade arena, I would reply with a
resounding yes. Let me tell you why.
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Before the trip, amidst a barrage of anti-China
legislation and critical press, I stated my belief that
engagement with China was a means to an end. That
is to say - China needed us and we needed China.
Now upon personal observation and reflection, I would-1 £AAG{(, AW tef -lAA I
say the former is most true. 3c-2Adz a,
China needs the United States to help bring it into
the 21 st Century. Leave no doubt about it: China must
enter the new millennium as ane player when it
comes to trade, human rights, the environment and
strategic issues.
3
OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS
This trip proved that if we engage China, as the
president and delegation did, we can speak directly to
the Chinese people about the importance of creating
strategic partnerships and about American values.
By going to China, the president delivered our
message -- promoting democracy, freedom, free
markets, human rights -- to hundreds of millions of
Chinese people. That was historic, especially when it
played, on national television. And that effort has
demonstrated, publicly, our expectations for reforms in
China.
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I also thought it important that President Clinton
and the delegation visited Hong Kong. This stop
underscored America's commitment to Hong Kong as it
struggles through tough economic times. And it
highlighted the commitment of Hong Kong's people to
self government and democracy. The president's visit
showed where things can lead if China chooses to
liberalize its system.
THE THREE RISKS
But trade continues to be a problem. To date, our
goal has been to open trade through a successful WTO
accession, which would further open the China market
to our goods and services.
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Risk l: China Trade as an Economic Issue
First is the economic risk the status quo poses to
us.
Our imports, from China and Hong Kong combined,
have grown from $50 to $72 billion. Our exports, only
from $30 to $34 billion. So our trade deficit has
grown to an enormous gap - and that chasm
threatens to grow wider.
The Agriculture Ministry, whose policies on wheat
and citrus violate our 1 992 Market Access Agreement,
fears a backlash from farmers.
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Industrial ministries own companies, joint ventures and
"pillar industries" fear the competition from foreign
firms. "Red capitalists" might lose concessions from
their relatives in the government. So the Chinese
government is reluctant to further open markets.
The Chinese also said they would stop import
substitution -- or replacing imports with domestic
production. But they haven't. These policies are unfair
to Americans. It is only fair and right that China is as
open to us as we are to them.
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Without significant movement on these issues in
the future, then, while the benefit of stable relationship
may remain, the good feelings between our two
countries will dissipate and not lead to substantive
progress.
That said, we must capitalize on the momentum
created by the trip to improve our trade relationship.
Congress' patience is wearing thin. Trade reform
clearly is in China's best interest. They got a lot out of
this trip. Now they need to reciprocate.
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IL. China Trade as a Political Issue
Second is a broader political risk to US-China
relations.
As long as our own economy remains strong, trade
problems will be one in a long list of items on our China
agenda. But when our economy turns down, if we are
still looking at flat exports and $50 billion or $60 billion
trade deficits, we should expect a great deal of anger
and fear from the public.
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Certainly those of us in the U.S. Senate who have
been long time advocates of Normal Trade Relations
with China are getting fed up. The lack of progress in
market access, distribution and our alarming trade
deficit have done nothing to deter our critics.
Moreover, with congressional division over trade
and our China policy, future engagement with China --
including WTO accession -- may become a divisive
issue in the 2000 presidential campaign. The
consequences of that are hard to predict. But ever
since the 1 950s and the "who lost China" debate,
when China policy has become a political issue, the
consequences have usually been bad.
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3: China's Economic Health
And third, the status quo may be a threat to
China's economic health.
At present, in most ways, China's economic
management is fairly stable thanks to the efforts of
Premier Zhu Rongji. The economy is growing.
Buildings are going up all over the country. Companies
are opening and people are finding opportunity.
At the same time, Chinese citizens are worried
about making ends meet.
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With massive unemployment and dramatic government
downsizing, it is no wonder that people are more
worried about survival than international dialogue.
However, I do not believe that China is strong enough
to survive alone. For our own interests, we should be
concerned that a ripple of instability in Asia's largest
country could result in a resounding wave of disaster.
To paraphrase Chairman Mao, the East is in the
red. And the status quo is not only bad for China, it is
dangerous for the world.
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NEXT STEPS
For the sake of our own economic interest of the
good relationship both countries need, and the healthy
China we need to see in the coming decades -- our
policies in the middle kingdom need to be a little
tougher and more focused.
We need a policy of tough love. Most of the
reforms we hope to see in the near future, include
lower tariffs and quotas, with a particular emphasis on
the rule of law; fewer subsidies; a more open and
market-driven economy. But what is our leverage, our
hook?
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This Congress, with so little time left and an
election fast approaching, likely won't pass
comprehensive legislation that will deal with the issues
we face with China: Trade and business; human rights;
environmental problems; and security concerns.
I don't know that there is a comprehensive silver
bullet. But I don't know that we can continue to deal
with China on an ad hoc basis.
But on trade, here's what I think we can do to get
China's attention, to make it get serious about entering
the WTO and finally gaining Normal Trade Relations
with the United States on a permanent basis.
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One, China must have a material incentive to enter
the WTO. I still believe that the Administration should
endorse, and Congress pass, a law to make permanent
Normal Trading Relations status automatic when China
enters the WTO.
But is China ready to enter the World Trade
Organization this year, next year or in the next decade?
They're not acting like it.
I used to think that China must be pressed, kicking
and screaming, into the global marketplace. Indeed,
the U.S. has played a hard hand in such an endeavor.
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And, yet, we are still stagnating after the President's
visit. China's ministries can think over WTO accession
at leisure, with no penalties for delay.
I told China's top leaders, including Premier Zhu
Rongji and the Chinese ag minister, that Congress and
the American people are getting impatient with China's
growing trade imbalance with the U.S. and their closed
markets.
Those of us who support engagement with China
are finding ourselves increasingly frustrated with a
country whose Great Wall is more than just a world
wonder. It is a brick wall we keep running into.
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I told them - and other members of the
congressional delegation also told them - in no
uncertain terms that they need to lower their barriers,
or there will be repercussions.
Some have argued we should lower the bar for
China to enter the WTO. To allow them to enter the
organization on lesser terms. I think that is a bad idea.
If we do that now, when they are backsliding, we
would be offering them incentive to wait longer, until
they are offered accession on terms that don't require
real reform.
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Two, U.S. industry must take a more active stand
in encouraging trade reform in China. Those of you
here today have set a fine example of finding a niche in
a neophyte marketplace. You have encountered risks
and you still face challenges.
However, I would challenge you today to think out
of the box. That is to say, how can your enterprise
contribute to China's internal development?
Can you clean up the environment by investing in
clean technologies? Promote human rights by setting
higher standards in labor practices than the norm?
Enlighten by education?
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I would ask you to think about more than trade and
how you can be a part of the larger picture. You must
engage more yourselves, and with members of
Congress. And what do you get in return? A healthy
China that is ready for accession to the World Trade
Organization on a mutually acceptable basis.
Three, China must have a moral incentive to enter
the WTO. So with our bilateral talks on Taiwan's
membership complete, the Administration should push
for Taiwan's rapid entry into the WTO, regardless of
where talks with China stand.
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We know from history and our recent trip to China
that officials there are very sensitive about Taiwan, and
our relationship with that country. We know that China
has opposed Taiwan becoming a member of the WTO
before it does.
But, as you know, Taiwan has willingly worked
toward WTO accession, and is willing to make
concessions to become a WTO member. They want to
play ball. We can get China's attention if we press for
Taiwan's immediate WTO accession. China's delay
should have a cost.
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Fourth, China must see a price for unnecessary
delay in entering WTO. So if we are still stagnating
months from now, we should open a broad market
access case under Section 301 of our trade law. It
should begin with the areas where China is violating
our 1 992 agreement, and set a deadline with sanctions
to follow if they do not shape up.
We reached a good agreement with China in 1 992
- on intellectual property and market access. But as I
have mentioned, China has said it would open its
markets and stop import substitution. But it hasn't, and
has in some sectors regressed.
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We need to let China know that we are serious
about invoking Section 301 if they don't move forward
on market access.
Let me mention a point about sanctions. Senator
Hagel and I are co-chairing an ad hoc group of senators
who think that America needs a bipartisan foreign
policy. One that is constructive rather than destructive.
One that has America's best interests at heart, rather
than politics at its root.
We have met on such issues as the effectiveness
of sanctions, and how to deal with India and Pakistan
after they deonated nuclear devices.
Our bottom line is: Let's do what's best for
America. When we invoke sanctions unilaterally, we -
meaning our ag producers and businesses and workers
- ultimately end up paying the price. I don't want that
to happen again. We need to protect our interests.
That's why we re sudyin se issues.
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And fifth, both we and China must realize that the
status quo has great risk.
We have seen the Asian Tigers caged, their once
rapidly growing economies slowed by a financial crisis
that knows no borders.
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I believe that this year's doomsaying about Asia is
at least as overstated as last year's boosterism. But in
hindsight, we see that with the good things come
corruption. Unhealthy ties between government and
business. Bad loans. Bad debts. Property bubbles.
Ultimately, a financial explosion.
We can be forgiven for missing this crisis once.
Everyone makes mistakes. But we should not be
forgiven if we don't learn from them. And that is
nowhere more true than China.
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Finally, while this trip offered us a chance to
stabilize the relationship between two of the world's
powers and left Americans with a good feeling because
President Clinton spoke bluntly and respectfully on
human rights, there still is a lot of substantive work to
do.
That brings me to this point. China must go
beyond a fundamental basic interest of avoiding
conflict and become a responsible international player
that can address issues that further promote peace and
prosperity and a healthy environment.
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CONCLUSION
Finally, we -- in Congress and the American public
-- need to reach an agreement on how we treat our
China policy. That essentially means when we reach a
basic consensus on such a policy that we do not then
play political games with it.
It means we send a clear, consistent message to
China on our policy. That doesn't mean we should
stifle debate on our China policy. Just that we do it in
a productive fashion. That we do what's right to secure
American interests. Few foreign relationships affect the
American people as much as this one. It's important
that we get it right - and keep it free of politics.
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As we engage China, I think we have to keep
American values and interests in mind. And when it
comes to trade, I think we need to show the Chinese
that we want to be strategic partners on security
issues. We expect that they will improve their
environment and human rights records. And, we're
serious about gaining access to their markets.
Serious about China working toward accession to
the WTO. Serious about taking action to show that this
issue -- China's protectionism -- is key to our long-term
relationship and important to America's interests.
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Through this historic trip, we advanced America's
interests. We didn't get all we wanted. For a country
that has more millennia under its belt than we have
centuries under our, progress is bound to be slow.
But we have significantly improved our relationship
with the world's most populous nation, and engaged
them in a constructive dialogue that I hope will bode
well for America, China and the world.
Thank you.
Now I will take questions.
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